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1 Introduction
An n−player bargaining problem is defined by an n−dimensional compact,
comprehensive, and convex utility possibility set U . Nash’s (1950) solution
is without doubt the most commonly accepted cooperative solution to the
problem.1 But this constitutes only part of the story; a more complete the-
ory would explain why the Nash solution emerges also in the noncooperative
framework.
The aim of this paper is to establish a general link between the non-
cooperative approach and the Nash solution. Noncooperative bargaining is
captured in a reduced form through the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944)
stability concept.2 We show that a stable set always exists (see below for a
definition). Moreover, if the utility set has a smooth surface, then any stable
set converges to the Nash bargaining solution. Finally we demonstrate the
equivalence of stationary equilibria of a unanimity bargaining game and the
stable set solution. As no assumptions are made as regards to the under-
lying physical environment,3 the model proposes a general noncooperative
foundation for the Nash bargaining solution.
The relation between the Nash solution and noncooperative bargaining
is of course not new. Binmore et al. (1986) show that the unique equilibrium
outcome of the two-player Rubinstein (1982) alternating oﬀers bargaining
game converges to the Nash solution when the time diﬀerence between oﬀers
becomes small. It is well known that the same is true also for the station-
ary equilibria in the n−player cake sharing context (see e.g. Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1990, and Chatterjee and Sabourian, 2000).4 However, the as-
sumption of private consumption is indispensable; resource monotonicity of
the solution (more cake implies bigger equilibrium shares for all players),
which is implied by this assumption, drives the uniqueness and convergence
results.
Much of the literature has focused on the issue of how to live without the
stationarity assumption, and less attention has been paid to the sensitivity of
the outcome to the underlying structure. Nevertheless, relaxing the private
consumption structure has non-trivial consequences. There are examples
1For an authorative discussion on n-player bargaining theory, see Thomson and Lens-
berg (1989).
2For a review, see Owen (1989).
3Except that it induces a smooth bargaining problem.
4 In an important paper, Krishna and Serrano (1996) construct an n−player cake shar-
ing game whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome converges to the Nash solu-
tion.
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of compact, convex, and comprehensive utility possibility sets that induce
peculiar stationary equilibria. In particular, there may be many stationary
equilibrium, and no such equilibrium need to converge to the Nash solution.5
Even the existence of a stationary equilibrium has been unclear. We show
that the existence is never an issue, and the convergence is guaranteed with
the smooth utility frontier -assumption.
The Solution The stable set solution is derived by assuming the fol-
lowing. Any player may impose an objection to a division of utilities by
demanding a new division. It takes one period before any such demand may
materialize. A dominance relation over the divisions of utilities is imposed:
a division u is dominated by a division v if and and only if the discounted
value of v exceeds the current value of u for some player.
With a short enough period there are no undominated divisions. We
focus on a subset of all divisions, the stable set, defined as follows: any
element of the stable set can only be dominated by an element outside the
set, and any element outside the stable set is dominated by some element of
the set. We show that the i−maximal points of a stable set correspond to
stationary equilibrium outcomes of a unanimity bargaining game. Thus the
stable set reflects stationary behavior in a reduced form.
Our notion of a stable set is closely related to the "Nash-like solution"
of Thomson and Lensberg (1989). The connection of the two concepts is
discussed in the final section.
2 The set up
There is a set N = {1, ..., n} of players and a compact, convex and compre-
hensive utility possibility set U ⊂ Rn+.6 7 The vector of utilities is denoted
by u = (u1, ..., un), or u = (ui, u−i). For any v ∈ U, let D(v) be the points
that Pareto dominate v ∈ U :
D(v) := {u ∈ U : u ≥ v}. (1)
For any v ∈ U, D(v) is a compact and v−comprehensive set. Pareto-optimal
outcomes P are then defined by P := {u ∈ U : D(u) = {u}} .
5Non-convergence is possible in non-smooth cases. Examples can be based on Thomson
and Lensberg (1989), pp. 120-4.
6Vector notation: x = y if xi ≥ yi for all i, x ≥ y iﬀ x = y and not xi = yi for all i,
and x > y iﬀ xi > yi for all i.
7X ⊂ Rk is d−comprehensive if x ∈ X and x ≥ y ≥ d imply y ∈ X. If d = 0, then X
is comprehensive.
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Bargaining takes place through objections against a potential division of
utilities. An objection is a specification for a new division. However, there
is a one-period delay before an objection may become eﬀective. Delay is
costly: The present value of player i’s next period utility ui is uiδ∆i , where
0 < δi < 1 is the discount factor and ∆ ≥ 0 is the length of the period.
An abstract stable set is defined with respect to a domain alternatives
and a dominance relation on this set. We let the domain be U . Dominance
relation Â is defined as follows: u Â v iﬀ uiδ∆i > vi, for some i ∈ N, for
u, v ∈ U. Set G ⊂ U is stable if
• (External stability) u 6∈ G implies there is v ∈ G s.t. v Â u,
• (Internal stability) u ∈ G implies there is no v ∈ G s.t. v Â u.
3 Characterization and Existence
If ∆ = 0 then a stable set has a simple structure: G is a stable set if and
only if G = {u} for any u ∈ P. To see the only if-part, assume that G is a
stable set. By internal stability, G contains a single element, say u. But by
external stability, u Â v for all v 6= u. Thus u ∈ P.
From now on, assume that ∆ > 0.Without loss of generality, let ∆ = 1.
Take u = (u1, ..., un), and call (δ−1i ui, u−i) the δi−extension of u ∈ U.8
Denote by u a typical point whose all δi−extensions lie on the Pareto-frontier
is :
u ∈ {u ∈ U : (δ−1i ui, u−i) ∈ P, for all i ∈ N}. (2)
Occasionally, such allocation is called a ”minimal point”.
For any nonempty set X ⊂ U, define the supremum of i’s feasible payoﬀs
in X by
mi(X) = sup{ui : u ∈ X}.
Theorem 1 A set G ⊂ U is stable if and only if G = D(u).
Proof. ”If”: Assume that G = D(u). By construction, ui ≥ ui =
mi(G)δi ≥ viδi, for all i ∈ N, for all u, v ∈ D(u). Thus, internal stability is
met. Take u /∈ D(u). Then there is a player i ∈ N such that ui > ui. This
implies that also ui = mi(G)δi > ui. Since mi(G) ∈ {ui : u ∈ D(u)}, the
external stability is met.
8The concepts are taken from Thomson - Lensberg (1989), Ch 8.
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”Only if”: Suppose G is a stable set. Then, by external stability,
v 6∈
\
i∈N
{u ∈ U : mi(G)δi ≤ ui} implies v 6∈ G. (3)
By internal stability,
v ∈
\
i∈N
{u ∈ U : mi(G)δi ≤ ui} implies v ∈ G. (4)
Thus \
i∈N
{u ∈ U : mi(G)δi ≤ ui} = G.
By (4), G is compact. Since U is a comprehensive set, there is u = (u1, ..., un) ∈
U such that mi(G)δi = ui for all i ∈ N. By construction, G = {u : u ≥ u}.
Then G = D(u) for D meeting (1), and u meeting (2), as required.
Thus, now we know that any stable set has a particular structure. A
stable set is characterized by a minimal point u = (u1, ..., un) : points in U
above u constitute a stable set. Moreover, a stable set is convex, and contains
n "maximal points" u1, ..., un that induce the highest possible payoﬀ in the
stable set for each 1, ..., n. Given the minimal point u, player i’s maximal
point satisfies ui = (δ−1i ui, u−i). Also, if u
i is an i−maximal point of a stable
set G, then mi(G) = uii.
The characterization leaves open the question of existence and unique-
ness. Indeed, it is clear in general there may be many stable sets, and in
some times it fails to exist. We prove that in our domain the existence is
guaranteed.
Recall that for any u = (ui, u−i), we denote the i’s maximal payoﬀ fixing
the other players’ payoﬀs at u−i by
mi(D(ui, u−i)) = max{u0i : (u0i, u−i) ∈ U}.
If u ∈ P, then mi(D(u)) = ui.
Theorem 2 A stable set exists.
Proof. Define function gi : U → R+
gi(u) := δimi(D(u)), for all (ui, u−i) ∈ U, for all i ∈ N. (5)
By convexity of U, gi is a continuous function. Let g(·) := (g1(·), ..., gn(·)),
and define function x¯ : U → R+ such that
x¯(u) := max{x ∈ R : xg(u) ∈ U}, for all u ∈ U.
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By compactness of U , x¯ is well defined. Construct function gˆi : U → R+
gˆi(u) := gi (u)min{x¯(u), 1}, for all u ∈ U.
If min{x¯(u), 1} = 1, then gˆ(u) ∈ U, and if min{x¯(u), 1} = x¯(u), then gˆ(u) =
x¯(u)g(u) ∈ U. Thus,
gˆ(u) = (gˆ1(u), ..., gˆn(u)) : U → U.
By convexity of U, function x¯ is continuous. Thus gˆ : U → Rn+ is a continuous
function. By Brouwer’s Theorem, there is a vector u ∈ U such that
gˆ (u) = u. (6)
If also
g (u) ∈ U, (7)
then, g (u) = u. This implies that u satisfies condition (2), and that D(u) is
a stable set. Thus condition (7) needs to be checked.
Suppose (7) does not hold. Then
x¯(u) < 1. (8)
By (6) and (8),
u = g(u)x¯(u) ∈ P. (9)
This implies that mi(D(u)) = ui, for all i ∈ N. By (5) and convexity of U
we have
g(u) = (δ1m1(D(u)), ..., δnmn(D(u)))
= (δ1u1, ..., δnun)
= δu
∈ U,
a contradiction. Thus g (u) ∈ U , as required.
The Existence Theorem is based on the convexity of U . Kultti and
Vartiainen (2003) show that in the cake division problem, which imposes a
degree of independency on players’ payoﬀs, the stable set is unique.9 The
method of proof is to first show that in any two-player bargaining problem
9The result relies on the Fisburn and Rubinstein (1980) specification of time consistent
preferences.
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the solution is unique. Then we show that such a solution is monotonic
w.r.t. to the size of the cake. This in turn implies that if there are two
distinct solutions for the general problem, then the minimal point of one
of them Pareto dominates the minimal point of the other, which cannot be
the case. However, in the current, unrestricted case, uniqueness cannot be
ensured. For an example of such case, see the next section.
4 Relationship with the Nash solution
We now argue that there is a particular relation between a the stable set and
the Nash bargaining solution. Denote by G∆ a stable set when the length of
the period is ∆ (there may be many stable sets). We are mainly interested
in the limit behavior of G∆ when ∆ becomes small.
First, introduce a vector of weights α = (α1, ..., αn) where
αi =
−1
ln δi
, for all i ∈ N.
Denote the α− weighted Nash solution by
uα := argmax
u∈U
Y
i∈N
uαii . (10)
Also denote by
H(u) :=
n
(v1, ..., vn) ∈ Rn :
Y
vαii =
Y
uαii
o
,
the α−weighted hyperbola that contains u.
For any∆ > 0, denote by u(∆) the minimal point and by u1(∆), ..., un(∆)
the maximal points of the stable set G∆, i.e., for all i,
ui(∆) = (δ−∆i ui(∆), u−i(∆)).
Lemma 3 u1(∆), ..., un(∆) lie on the same hyperbola.
Proof. Recall thatY
i
uji (∆)
αi =
Y
i
δ−∆αii ui(∆)
αi
= δ−∆αii
Y
i
ui(∆)
αi
= e∆
Y
i
ui(∆)
αi ,
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which is independent of j ∈ N. Thus uj(∆) ∈ H(ui(∆)), for all i, j.
First we establish that in the two-player case the Nash solution always
belongs to G∆.
Theorem 4 Let n = 2. Then uα ∈ G∆, for all ∆ > 0.
Proof. By Lemma (3), uj(∆) ∈ H(ui(∆)), and hence the intersection of
G∆ and the Pareto frontier is the arc between the intersection of a hyperbola
and the Pareto frontier. Since diﬀerent hyperbolas are nested, and the
Pareto frontier concave, the intersection of the highest hyperbola and the
Pareto frontier must belong to G∆. Hence uα ∈ G∆.
An immediate corollary of the previous theorem is that since the sta-
ble set necessarily becomes ”small” when ∆ tends to zero, and since the
Nash solution always belongs to the stable set, it follows that the stable
set actually shrinks to the Nash solution as ∆ tends to zero.
Unfortunately, it need not be the case that uα ∈ G∆ when n > 2;
G∆ ∩G∆0 may be empty, for some ∆,∆0 in such case. However, we are able
to establish a weaker convergence result.
We say that a sequence {G∆} of stable sets converges to {u} in the
Hausdorﬀ metric as ∆ tends to zero if for any open ball with radius r around
u ∈ U, denoted by Br(u), there is ∆r > 0 such that G∆ ⊂ Br(u), for all
∆ ∈ (0,∆r).
Theorem 5 Let P be smooth. Then any sequence of stable sets converges
to {uα} as ∆ tends to 0.
The proof can be summarized as follows. Consider the three (n) player
case (see Fig. 1). Think of the surface P of U as a chart of 1-dimensional
curves (n − 2 -dimensional manifolds), each reflecting an intersection of
P and a hyperbola. As ∆ becomes small, a (sub)sequence of stable sets
shrinks to a point u∗ on P . If u∗ is distinct from uα, then, since P is
smooth, the envisioned chart over P is locally homeomorphic to an open
disk that is permeated by a collection of line segments, each corresponding
to a hyperbola. Any neighborhood of u∗ also contains the maximal points
of the stable set for small enough ∆. Under any ∆, the maximal points lie
on the same hyperbola, and they span a 2 -dimensional simplex T . Thus, it
follows that T becomes embedded into a line segment as ∆ tends 0, which
leads to a contradiction.
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[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Proof. Let {G∆}∆>0 be a collection of stable sets. For any ∆, let u(∆)
be the minimal point of G∆, and u1(∆), ..., un(∆) ∈ P the corresponding
maximal points. By (3), there is a unique n − 1 -dimensional hyperplane
L(∆) that contains u1(∆), ..., un(∆). Since (δ−∆i − 1)ui(∆) tends to zero as
∆ becomes small, there is a subsequence {∆} converging to zero such that,
for some u∗ ∈ P, and some hyperplane L∗,10
ui(∆) → u∗, for all i, (11)
L(∆) → L∗. (12)
Denote the hyperplane that supports H(u) at u ∈ U by LH(u). Since P
is smooth, (11) implies that
LH(ui(∆))→ L∗, for all i. (13)
Denote by V (u) the n − 2 dimensional hyperplane that supports H(u) at
u ∈ L(∆) in the subspace L(∆). Then
V (ui(∆)) = LH(ui(∆)) ∩ L(∆), for all i.
Suppose, to the contrary of the theorem, that u∗ 6= uα. Since V (ui(∆))
and V (uj(∆)) support the same hyperbola in the same subspace and, by
(12) and (13), they approach the same limit, we have
minv
©°°uj(∆)− v°° : v ∈ V (ui(∆))ª
kuj(∆)− ui(∆)k → 0, for all j 6= i, (14)
as depicted in Fig. 2.
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
10Since, for any ∆, there are p ∈ [0, 1]n and ui(∆) ∈ U such that L(∆) = ui(∆) + {v ∈
Rn : v · p = 0}, the set of parameters defining {L(∆)}∆>0 is bounded.
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For any c ∈ Rn+, denote by Ac the linear transformation matrix
Ac =


c1 0 · · · 0
0 c2
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 cn


.
Abusing the notation, Acx = (c1x1, ..., cnxn) and AcX = {Acx0 : x0 ∈ X},
for any x ∈ X ⊂ Rn+. Given ∆, choose c(∆) = (c1(∆), ..., cn(∆)) such that
ci(∆) = (δ
−∆
i − 1)ui(∆), for all i ∈ N. (15)
Denote the n−1 -dimensional standard simplex by T =
©
x ∈ Rn+ :
P
xi = 1
ª
.
Now11
co{u1(∆), ..., un(∆)} = u(∆) +Ac(∆)T, for all ∆. (16)
Fix some player i. Define
j(∆) = argmax
j
h
min
v
©°°uj(∆)− v°° : v ∈ V (ui(∆))ªi .
Take any ε > 0. By (14), there is ∆ε such that, for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆ε),
minv
©°°uj(∆)(∆)− v°° : v ∈ V (ui(∆))ª°°uj(∆)(∆)− ui(∆)°° < ε. (17)
By (16) and (17), for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆ε),
u(∆) +Ac(∆)T ⊂
n
u : ku− vk < ε
°°°uj(∆)(∆)− ui(∆)°°° , for v ∈ V (ui(∆))o .
(18)
Since, by (15), °°°A−1c(∆)uj(∆)(∆)−A−1c(∆)ui(∆)°°° = √2,
condition (18) reduces to
T ⊂
n
u : ku− vk < ε
√
2, for v ∈ V (A−1c(∆)[u
i(∆)− u(∆)])
o
, for all ∆ ∈ (0,∆ε).
I.e., T is contained by the ε
√
2−neighborhood of the hyperplane V (A−1c(∆)[u
i(∆)−
u(∆)]), defined with respect to the utility possibility set A−1c(∆)[U − u(∆)].
But since ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, this means that the n− 1 -dimensional
simplex T is contained by an n−2 -dimensional hyperplane, a contradiction.
11 coX is a convex hull of X ⊂ Rn.
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4.1 Counter examples
Convergence need not hold if P is not smooth. For an example, consider
the three player "pyramid" case U = {x ∈ R3+ : x1 + 2maxi=2,3{xi} ≤ 2}.
Assume equal discount factors δ. The minimal point u of the unique stable
set is defined by
(u1, u2, u3) =
µ
2δ∆
1 + δ∆
,
δ∆
1 + δ∆
,
δ∆
1 + δ∆
¶
.
This converges to (1, 1/2, 1/2) as ∆ tends to 0. However, the Nash solution
for the problem is (2/3, 2/3, 2/3) (see Fig. 3). Hence smoothness is crucial
for the convergence result. Since a non-smooth utility space can be approx-
imated by smooth ones, there is an important discontuity in convergence of
stable sets.
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]
Now we use U to construct an example of a case qirh multiple stable
sets. First, identify a triangular problem V = {x ∈ R3+ : x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 2}
(see Fig. 4). The minimal point v of the unique stable set related to this is
(v1, v2, v3) =
µ
2δ
1 + 2δ
,
2δ
1 + 2δ
,
2δ
1 + 2δ
¶
.
Now perturb U by substracting ε from the 1’s maximal payoﬀ and adding ε
to the maximal payoﬀs of 2 and 3. Denote the resulting utility space by,
Uε =
½
x ∈ R3+ : x1 +
µ
2− ε
1 + ε
¶
max
i=2,3
{xi − ε} ≤ 2− ε
¾
.
The convergence point u∗ of the unique stable set of this problem is
u∗ =
µ
1− ε
2
,
1
2
+
ε
2
,
1
2
+
ε
2
¶
.
Now, let W be the intersection of Uε and V (see Fig 5). The convergence
point u∗ of Uε belongs to V and hence it belongs toW. In the neighborhood
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of u∗,W coincides with Uε. The Nash solution of V belongs to Uε and hence
it belongs to W. In the neighborhood of this point, W coincides with Uε.
Thus, for small enough ∆, both neighborhoods contain a stable set implying
that for such δ∆ there are two stable sets (this property is not related to the
non-smoothness of the surfaces). For closely related analysis, see Thomson
and Lensberg, 1989, Ch. 8.2.
[FIGURE 4 AND 5 AROUND HERE]
5 Relation to a Bargaining Game
In this section, we assume that U is strictly convex. We study the standard
unanimity bargaining game Γ. At any stage t ∈ {0, 1, ...},
• Player i(t) makes an oﬀer v ∈ U. Players j 6= i(t) accept or reject the
oﬀer in the ascending order of their index.
• If all j 6= i(t) accept, then v is implemented. If j is the first who
rejects, then j becomes i(t+ 1).
• i(0) = 1.
We concentrate on the stationary equilibria of the game, where:
1. Each i ∈ N makes the same proposal v(i) whenever he serves as the
proposer.
2. Each i’s acceptance decision in period t depends only on vi that is
oﬀered to him in that period.
Next we show that any stationary equilibrium constitutes a maximal
point of a stable set (let ∆ = 1).
Proposition 6 v is a stationary equilibrium outcome of Γ if and only if it
is a 1−maximal point of a stable set.
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Proof. Only if: In any equilibrium, i(t)’s oﬀer v(i(t)) = (vj(i(t)))j∈N
is accepted at stage t ∈ {0, 1...}. In stationary equilibrium the time index t
can be relaxed from v(i(t)). An oﬀer vj by player i is accepted by all j 6= i
if
vj ≥ δvj(j), for all j 6= i. (19)
Player i’s equilibrium oﬀer v(i) maximizes his payoﬀ with respect to con-
straint (19). By the comprehensiveness and strict convexity of U, all con-
straints in (19) must bind, and v(i) ∈ P . I.e.
vj(i) = δvj(j), for all j 6= i.
Thus, by Theorem 1, D(δvi(i), v−i(i)) constitutes a stable set and v(i) its
i−maximal point. Choosing t = 0 and i(0) = 1, gives the result.
If: Choose a stable set. Let vj be its j−maximal point, for any j ∈ N .
Then, by Theorem 1,
vij = δv
j
j , for all j 6= i.
Construct the following stationary strategy: Player i always oﬀers vi and
accept anything above δvii. Player i’s oﬀer v is accepted by all j 6= i only if
vj ≥ δvjj , for all j 6= i. (20)
Since vi maximizes i’s payoﬀ given (20), a deviation by i cannot be profitable.
Given this, a deviation in acceptance cannot increase i’s payoﬀ either since
in the next period he would get payoﬀ at most vii.
Since a stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution uα as the
time interval becomes small, it follows by Proposition 6 that also all sta-
tionary equilibria associated to Γ converge to uα.
Corollary 7 A stationary equilibrium of Γ exists and converges to uα as ∆
tends to zero.
6 Discussion
The current paper is closely related to Thomson (1988), Lensberg (1988),
and Thomson and Lensberg (1989), Ch. 7 and 8, where the axiom of mul-
tilateral (population) stability is imposed on solutions, and the notion of
"Nash-like" solution is developed. It can be shown that the minimal point
of the stable set is a particularly parametrized Nash-like solution.
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Thomson and Lensberg discuss the convergence properties of the Nash-
like solution. They point out that in a smooth problem the Nash-like solution
converges to the Nash solution. Their reasoning is based on the fact that if
in a smooth problem all two-player components of a Pareto-optimal point
constitute bilateral Nash-solutions in their respective two-player utility pro-
jections, then the Pareto-optimal point also constitutes a Nash solution of
the whole problem.12
In addition, Thomson and Lensberg note that the existence of a Nash-like
solution can be obtained by using Varian’s (1981) result on the existence of
a fixed points in continuous vector fields. To the contrary, our proof appeals
to the familiar Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem.
Rubinsten, Safra, and Thomson (1992) characterize the Nash solution
in a model whose motivation bears similarity to our framework. They use
a system of objections and counterobjections to define the Nash solution.
There are important diﬀerences to our approach. First, the Rubinstein et al.
model is relies on an asymmetry between objections and counterobjections.
Hence their solution does not conceptually relate to the stable set (except
in terms of convergence).
To see this, let us formulate the Rubinstein et al. solution by saying
that an outcome u is p−unstabilized by u0 if pu0i > ui and puj ≤ u0j for
some i 6= j. Rubinstein et al. show that the unique intersection of the not
p−unstabilized outcomes, p ∈ (0, 1), is the Nash solution. However, the set
of p−stable allocations does not conceptually relate to the stable set under
δ∆ = p. For one thing, the internal stability need not hold for p−stable out-
comes as such outcome may well be an objection against another p−stable
allocation (if two outcomes are each another’s objections then they are also
counterobjections). For another thing, nothing guarantees the external sta-
bility since a p−unstable outcome need not be objected via a p−stable one.
Second, Rubinstein et al. analyse the two players case, and it is not
clear how to extend it to a multi-player scenario. A straightforward exten-
sion would allow only bilateral objections/counterobjections.13 Along the
argument made in this paper, that would lead to a the Nash solution in the
class of smooth problems.
12Given this, the result follows since in smooth problems the bilateral coordinates of
the minimal point are continuous in ∆.
13Along the two-player projections, and keeping the other players’ payoﬀs fixed.
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